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Managing Bid Protests
u Objective is not to minimize number of bid protests
u Protests may correct procurement mistakes:
– Honest mistake: Limited information & bounded rationality
– “Dishonest” mistake: Bias by procurement officials
u Objective is to “right size” number of protests
– Encourage protests that correct (significant) mistakes
– Discourage protests that don’t make significant corrections
u What are DoD’s “levers of control” for managing the 
number and nature of protests?
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Managing Vendor Protest Incentives
u Profit from Protest 
= Expected Benefits – Expected Costs
u Expected Benefits 
= Prob (Merit)×Prob (Sustained│Merit)×Contract Revenue
u Expected Costs
= Search & Information + Legal + Reputation + 
Opportunity Costs
u Levers of control?
– Influence expected benefits
– Influence expected costs
– Encourage “good” protests, discourage “bad” protests
Added Revenue
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Split-Awards to Manage Bid Protests
u Benefit of winning protest  much larger 
under “winner-take-all” vs. split-award
– Winner-take-all = 100% vs. 0%
– Split-award ≈ 70% vs. 30%
u Raises “hurdle” to file protest
– Expected benefit insufficient for “bad” protests?
– Expected benefit sufficient for “good” protests?
u Key question: What is the right split?
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The Problem with Fixed Splits
Winner-Take-All
70/30 Split
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Simple Model: Two Sellers
Notation:
 PL = Lower bid price
 PH = Higher bid price
 Let R = PL / PH
 0  ≤ R  ≤ 1
 SL = Share or split awarded low bidder
 SH = Share or split awarded high bidder
 SL + SH = 1
 0 ≤ SH ≤ ½ & ½ ≤ SL ≤ 1 
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Endogenous Split Award Function
Example Split Function:
 SH = αRβ
- α = maximum share to low value bidder (0 ≤ α ≤ ½)
- β ≥ 0
- SH is increasing in α & R
- SH is decreasing in β
DoD decision: What are the best α & β?
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Split Award Scenarios with SH = αRβ
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Split Award Scenarios with SH = ½Rβ
β = ∞
β = 10
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Factors Under Investigation
u Imperfect information & error
u Dynamic/repeated procurement
u Learning/experience effects
u Pre-bid investment & innovation
u Economies of scale
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Imperfect Information & Award Error
u Award error could arise from a number of sources:
– Imperfect information about bids (price or quality)
– Accidental error by buying agent
– Buying agent bias
u For simplicity, we model the source of award error 
as imperfect information about seller bids
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Imperfect Information & Award Error
u Without loss of generality, assume buyer knows PH
but has imperfect information about PL
u Let R = PL / PH
– 0  ≤ R  ≤ 1
u Let r = Buyer’s estimate of R
– 0  ≤ r  ≤ 1
u r ∼ B(N,R) Bernoulli?
– Binomial with N draws & expected value R
– Higher N ⇒ more accurate estimate of R
